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CRImINAL

LAW

-

INSTRUCTIONS

TO

JURY

DoUBT-JuaOR's INDIVIDUAL DUTY.-Stale

-

REASONABLE

v. Howell (Supreme

Court of Montana, October 21, 1901), 66 Pac. 291.-The above
case raises again a question which has come up a number of times
for decision, and which has not received by any means a uniform
answer from the courts. It-is this, "Is a court bound to instruct
a jury in a criminal trial that if a single juror has a reasonable
doubt of the defendant's guilt, he must adt upon his own judgment and not surrender his own conviction, unless convinced."
In the case quoted Howell was indicted for murder. His counsel presented to the court a point for charge, as follows: "You
are instructed that your verdict must be unanimous, and that
each juror should decide upon his oath, from the law as given to
you by the court and the evidence in the case, as to what his
verdict should bb. No juror should yield his deliberate, 'conscientious convictions as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, either at the instance of the majority of the jury for the
sake of unanimity, or to prevent a mistrial, but you are further
56
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instructed that nothing in this instruction is to be taken to mean
that you shall not fully and fairly discuss among yourselves all
the evidence and facts surrounding the case, as disclosed by the
evidence or that any of your number shall not be open to conviction by fair, honest argument, by any member or members of
the jury, founded upon the evidence produced on the trial and
the law as given you by the court."
This instruction the court refused to give. The jury found
a verdict of guilty. A new trial was refused, and the action
of the trial court was affirmed by the Supreme Court, by a
decision of two to one, Milburn, J., delivering a dissenting
opinion.
The majority of the court deals with this question shortly as
follows: "If in this particular case the court was in error in
refusing to submit the instruction requested, it must necessarily
follow that a court should instruct the jury as to their individual
duties in all cases when requested, or else we must conclude that
it was error in the court to refuse to submit the instruction
requested in this case merely because counsel for the defendant
was of opinion that the jury required it. As was said in State
v. Hamilton, 57 Iowa, 596, 'A jury need not be advised of so
simple a proposition. The usual method of instructing upon the
measure of proof reqbired in criminal cases is sufficient."
Milburi, J., in his dissenting opinion, calls attention to the
fact that it is undenied that the instruction, as put, expresses the
law, and could not have been the ground for a reversal if the trial
court had seen fit to give it, but states that the question here
is whether the refusal to give it was error, in view of the fact
that nowhere else in the charge of the court was there any statement of the individual and separate responsibility of each juror.
He then adverts to the danger incident to allowing the jury to
act without adequate instructions as to their individual duty.
The authorities seem to be divided on the point at issue. The
older authorities, such as Commonwealth v. Tuey, 8 Cush. I
(1851), seem, by implication at least, to be authorities in favor
of the majority opinion in the principal case. In Commonwealt&
v. Tuey, as justly remarked by Milburn, J., in his dissenting
opinion in the principal case, the doctrine of mutual concessions
was pushed "to such an extent and in such language that,... the
average juror would be convinced that he had no right to think
his own thoughts if his views were opposed by those of eleven
others." The instruction there was, "If much the larger number of your panel are for a conviction, a dissenting juror should
consider whether a doubt in his own mind is a reasonable one,
which makes no impression on the minds of so many men, equally
honest, equally intelligent with himself, and who have heard
the same evidence, with the same attention, with an equal desire
to arrive at the truth, and under the sanction of the same oath."
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This language was approved by the Suprme Court of Massachusetts. In State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376 (1881), the trial
court refused to charge that "each juror in this case must be
governed by his own judgment, founded on the law and the
evidence, and must not be governed, controlled or influenced
by the judgment or opinions of others in agreeing to a verdict."
The Supreme Court, in refusing a new trial, substantially quoted
the language of the Tuey case and cited it as authority.
In State v. Rohrbacher, 19 Iowa, 151 (18Q5), the instruction
asked was: "If any one of the jury entertain a reasonable doubt
as to the sufficiency of the proof to establish any one material
averment in the indictment, you must give the defendant the
benefit of such doubt and (acquit the defendant).' The trial
court modified this by striking out the words in brackets. The
Supreme Court say of this instruction: "As asked, it was clearly
objectionable. Such a proposition would entitle a party to an
acquittal if any one juror entertained a reasonable doubt upon
any material averment. It is a reasonable doubt entertained by
the jury, and not any one member thereof, that justifies an
acquittal"
And in State v. Hamilton, 57 Iowa, 596, where a substantially
similar request was made and refused, the court say: "Of course
each juror is to act upon his own judgment. He is not required
to surrender his convictions unless convinced. He may be aided
by his fellow-jurors in arriving at the truth, but he is not to find
a verdict against his judgment merely because the others entertain views different from his own. But a jury need not be
advised of so simple a proposition. The usual method of instructing upon the measure of proof required in criminal cases is sufficient." The inquiry seems pertiient, -ifthis be the law, why

should not the juror be told so? If, as we know, very slight
matters tend to mislead a juryman as to his duty, can it be possible too clearly to define that duty? Is it, after all, something
that is "so simple" that he may be expected to know it a *riori?
In this case State v. Rohrbacher (supra) was sited as authority,
but it is submitted that the vice of the instruction asked in that
case was that it demanded an acquittal in case of disagreement
by a single juror, which is admitted on all hands to be unsound.
In State v. Hurst, 23 Mont. 484 (1899), such an instruction
was asked and refused. The refusal was sustained apparently on
several grounds. The Supreme Court thought that it had been
practically given in the general charge to the jury. They also
thought that the trial court should be allowed a discretion as
to whether it should or should not give such instruction. They
admitted that the instruction properly stated the law, and that
the giving of it would not have been error, but said that, in view
of the trial judge's discretion in the matter, and the fact that it
had been subsiaitially given in other words, its refusal was no
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error. Milburn, J., who dissents in the present case, concurred
in the opinion in the case cited, and states that the Hurst case
does not rule the principal case.
There are several authorities on the other side. For instance,
in Castle v. State, 75 Ind. 146 (1881), where the defendant was
tried and convicted for assault and battery with intent to murder,
he asked an instruction stating the general doctrine of reasonable
doubt as applicable to the jury as a whole, and closing as follows:
"or, if any one of the jury, after having duly considered all the
evidence and after having consulted with his fellow-jurymen,
should entertain such reasonable doubt, the jury cannot, in such
case, find the defendant guilty." This instruction was refused.
The Supreme Court say, "Upon looking through the wellprepared charges given by the court, we do not find the idea
embodied or stated in them, that each juror must be satisfied
by the evidence of the defendant's guilt, before a conviction can
be had, except as it may be involved in the charge that the jury
generally must be so satisfied. The proposition, embodied in
the charge asked -. . . is correct in point of law. We think,
notwithstanding the general charge of the court, the defendant had the right to have the charge asked given" The judgment was reversed.
In State v. Witt, 34 Kas. 488 (1885), an instruction similar
to those above quoted was asked to the effect that if one juror
entertained a reasonable doubt, "then it is the duty of the jury
to acquit the defendant." This instruction was refused, and its
refusal held no error. The Supreme Court said that it was not
the law that the remaining eleven juiors must yield their deliberate judgments to the doubts of the twelfth juror, and agree
to an acquittal. But in the same case defendant requested an
instruction to the effect that if any juror after deliberation and
consultation should entertain a reasonable doubt, "then the jury
cannot find the defendant guilty." This instruction the court
also refused. Its refusal was held error, on practically the
same grounds as those stated in Castle v. State (supra), though
in this case, as in that, the jury were instructed as a whole on
the subject of reasonable doubt.
Horton, C. J., dissented on the ground that a general instruction was sufficient; that the jury could not be misled by the mere
failure to dwell on the individual juror's duty, and that as
defendant had the right to poll the jury, he could ascertain if
the verdict was the expression of the conscience of each member
thereof. Conceding, therefore, the correctness of the instruction
in stating the law, he thought its refusal immaterial, and hence
no error.
The latest case taking a view similar to the two last cited is
People v. Dole, 122 Cal. 486 (1898), decided by the Supreme
Court of California in bane. In this case an instruction, prac-
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tically the same as that requested in the principal case, was asked
and refused. This refusal, amongst oter errors, was held good
cause for the granting of a new trial. The court said: "This is
a correct statement of the duty of a juror, and should have been
given: If any juror needed an instruction upon this point, it
was harmful to refuse it; if no juror needed the instruction, it
would have been harmless to give it."
Outside the cases cited the exact question does not seem to.
have been adjudicated. There seems to be mdeh weight in the
argument of the dissenting justice in the principal .case, and
also in the sentence quoted from People v. Dole (supra).

